Criminal Procedure - Short Form Indictments by C., C. C.
Louisiana Law Review
Volume 6 | Number 4
The Work of the Louisiana Supreme Court for the
1944-1945 Term
May 1946
Criminal Procedure - Short Form Indictments
C. C. C.
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews and Journals at LSU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion
in Louisiana Law Review by an authorized editor of LSU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact kreed25@lsu.edu.
Repository Citation
C. C. C., Criminal Procedure - Short Form Indictments, 6 La. L. Rev. (1946)
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.lsu.edu/lalrev/vol6/iss4/17
"nighttime" is "the period between sunset and sunrise,"15 the
court has held', that evidence showing entry to have been made
"in the evening sometime after dark"' 7 was clearly sufficient to
justify the jury's conclusion that the offense was committed after
sunset. Massachusetts by statute 8 similarly defines "nighttime,"
but in the tort case of Sodekson v. Lynch,19 where there was no
direct testimony as to the exact time of the injury, the court held
that night had begun at the time described by the plaintiff as
"dusk turning to dark" and at a time when she, being possessed
or normal eyesight, could not see.
According to a decision of the Supreme Court of Georgia °
the defendant will be given the benefit of the doubt where the
evidence shows that the burglary was committed within a rela-
tively short period-one-half of which was day and one-half
night. This decision is in accord with the usual policy of strict
construction of criminal statutes in favor of the accused.
The desirability of a statutory definition of "nighttime," to
be applied wherever possible, is well illustrated by the principal
case wherein Chief Justice O'Niell and Justice Higgins filed vig-
orous and well reasoned dissents based upon the theory that the
so-called "twilight period" is not included in "nighttime." Still,
this same difficulty would have been present, if the burglary had
occurred after the adoption of the Criminal Code, for there was
no direct evidence as to the precise time when the apartment was
entered thus excluding the ready availability of the almanac to
establish the nature of the crime.
NINA J. NICHOLS
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE-SHoRT Foim INDICTMENTS-The bill of
information charged that the defendant, Davis, "did commit the
crime of gambling as defined by Article 90 of the Louisiana Crim-
inal Code." Defendant tendered a motion for a bill of particulars
which was granted and the particulars furnished. The motion
to quash the indictment and the plea of unconstitutionality were
overruled. Defendant excepted and appealed. Held, the use of
the short form, authorized by Article 235 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure of 1928 as amended by Act 223 of 1944, was sufficient
15. Cal. Pol. Code (Deering, 1944) § 3260.
16. People v. Mendoza, 17 Cal. App. 157, 118 Pae. 964 (1911).
17. 17 Cal. App. 157, 159, 118 Pac. 964, 965.
18. Mass. Gen. Laws (1932) c. 278, § 10 et seq.
19. 314 Mass. 161, 49 N.E. (2d) 901 (1943).
20. Caesar Water v. Georgia, 53 Ga. 567 (1875).
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and any possible deficiency in the short form information was
cured by the answer filed by the district attorney pursuant to de-
fendant's motion for a bill of particulars. State v. Davis, 23 So.
(2d) 801 (La. 1945).
The development, function and constitutionality of the short
form indictment have been discussed in two recent comments
in the LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW.' The Davis decision, passing upon
the sufficiency of the short form indictment for all crimes in-
cluded in the 1942 Criminal Code, is of momentous significance
and merits a brief re-appraisal of certain fundamental principles
brought out in those previous writings.
The long and cumbersome common law forms of indictment
were developed during a period in English legal history when
formalism was at its height. With one hundred and sixty capital
offenses, it was not surprising that the judges of that day seized
upon purely technical defects in the charge to save offenders from
penalties which were excessive.2 As our criminal laws became
more humane, penalties for the various crimes were adjusted in
accordance with the seriousness of the offense. Thus the need
for the technical common law indictment forms disappeared, and
they became a device whereby astute lawyers could often secure
the release of criminals who had been convicted after a full and
fair trial. A step was taken toward simplifying indictment forms
when the Louisiana legislature adopted the 1928 Code of Crim-
inal Procedure. Article 235 of that code authorizes the use of the
short form indictment which succinctly apprises the accused of
the particular crime with which he is charged. If the offender de-
sires the details or circumstances of his alleged transgression, he
can secure them through a bill of particulars. While the grant-
ing of a bill of particulars is left to the discretion of the trial
judge, an abuse of this discretion (which deprives the accused
of a full opportunity to understand and meet the charge) is re-
versible error.3 This method of procedure, suggested in the
American Law Institute's model Code of Criminal Procedure, has
been adopted in a number of states, and its constitutionality has
been universally upheld.4  Despite this simplification, reversals
based on technicalities in indictment forms did not abate, since
1. Broussard, The Short Form Indictment: History, Development and
Constitutionality (1944) 6 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 78; Cutrer, Indictment Forms
-A Technical Loophole for the Accused (1945) 6 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 461.
2. Comment (1945) 6 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 461.
3. State v. De Arman, 153 La. 345, 95 So. 803 (1923); State v. Larocca, 156
La. 567, 100 So. 720 (1924); State v. Cryar, 158 La. 498, 104 So. 304 (1925).
4. Comment (1944) 6 LoUISIANA LAW RE viEw 78.
[Vol. VI
short forms were limited to those crimes specifically set out in
Article 235.5 Faced with this discrepancy, the legislature, in 1944,
acted upon the recommendation of the Criminal Law Section of
the Louisiana Bar Association." It amended and extended the
scope of the short form indictment article to include all offenses
set out in the Criminal Code.7 By authority of this amendment
the information in the Davis case was drawn."
The instant case marks the first challenge to the constitution-
ality of a short form indictment drawn pursuant to the 1944
amendment. It is not surprising that criminal lawyers, who were
disturbed that technical defense opportunities had been further
legislated away, should marshal every possible argument against
the statute. Fortunately the majority of the court recognized
the fact that the newly authorized short forms differ only in
phraseology from those already sanctioned by Article 235. The
substance and purpose remain constant." The accused is specifi-
cally informed of the crime charged, and the need for further
details entitles him to a bill of particulars setting out the form
and circumstances of the offense. A definition of the crime may
be obtained by reference to the Criminal Code. This same
method and procedure was followed as to the short forms pre-
viously sanctioned by Article 235.
The importance of the issue involved warrants a careful
analysis of the dissenting opinions of Justices Fournet, Higgins
and Ponder. Justice Fournet, who dissented in part, took the
position that the amendment is violative of the mandate in Arti-
cle I, Section 10, of the Louisiana Constitution of 1921 which
specifies "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be in-
formed of the nature and cause of accusation against him." In
developing this point, he stated:
"The information in the instant case does not allege a single
fact or circumstance upon which the offense is based. There
5. State v. Morgan, 204 La. 499, 15 So. (2d) 866 (1943); State v. Fazzo,
23 So. (2d) 99 (La. 1945); State v. Varnado, 23 So. (2d) 106 (La. 1945), dis-
cussed in Comment (1945) 6 LOUISIANA LAW Rsvi w 461, 464.
6. See Bennett, Louisiana Legislation of 1944: Criminal Law and Proce-
dure (1944) 6 LOUISIANA LAw REVMW 9, 16-18.
7. La. Act 223 of 1944.
8. State v. Davis, 23 So. (2d) 801, 803 (La. 1945). "The short form of in-
formation employed in this prosecution is authorized by the provisions of Act
223 of 1944, this being a statute that amended and re-enacted Article 235 of
the Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure, as amended by Act 147 of 1942."
9. State v. Davis, 23 So. (2d) 801, 803 (La. 1945): ". . . it was proper to
charge in the information, by using the name and article number of the
offense committed that defendant 'did commit the crime of gambling as de-
fined by Article 90 of the Louisiana Criminal Code.'"
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is nothing in it from which the accused can tell or even guess
what act or acts he is being charged with having done. At
most it is a mere statement or conclusion of the district at-
torney. It is barren of any statement which informs the ac-
cused or the court of the acts allegedly committed by the ac-
cused upon which the prosecuting attorney has based his con-
clusions." 10
The constitution does not require that all the details of the crime
be couched in the indictment. The fact that the accused is accu-
rately informed as to the crime charged, together with his right
to secure the details and circumstances of the crime by means
of a bill of particulars, fully protects his constitutional rights. It
is significant to note that Article I, Section 10, is identical with
constitutional provisions in other states where short form indict-
ments have been upheld."
In the instant case the accused was charged with the crime
of gambling as defined by Article 90 of the Louisiana Criminal
Code. 2 Justices Higgins and Ponder in their dissents took the
position that this article is a general statute which can be vio-
lated in a number of ways. They reasoned that reference to
Article 90 of the Criminal Code did not sufficiently apprise the
accused of the ground or basis of the prosecution." Justice Ham-
iter, speaking for the majority of the court, answered this by
pointing out that the net effect of the gambling article is to take
the offense of gambling as created by pre-existing statutes and
place it under one comprehensive statute, making it an offense
to conduct gambling "as a business."'14 This last element (con-
ducting gambling as a business) is the feature which distin-
guishes criminal from non-criminal activity. 5 That the offense
can be committed in a number of different ways does not provide
a sound basis for holding that the statute is a "general" one which
denounces an offense not sufficiently specific to be charged by
the short form indictment. Murder may also be committed in a
number of ways-by the killing of a human being with a gun,
knife, bludgeon or other instrumentality where the assailant has
the specific intent to kill or where his intent was to "inflict great
bodily harm." It may also result from an accidental killing in
10. Id. at 817.
11. Comment (1944) 6 LoUISrANA LAw REVIEW 78.
12. Art. 90, La. Crim. Code of 1942.
13. Justices Higgins' and Ponder's dissenting opinions in 23 So. (2d) 801,
813 (La. 1945).
14. State v. Davis, 23 So. (2d) 801 (La. 1945).
15. Comment (1945) 6 LOUISIANA LAW REviEw 461.
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the perpetration of a dangerous felony.16 The sufficiency of the
short form for murder, manslaughter and rape, however, has not
been seriously questioned. 17 There is no sound basis for putting
the offense of gambling in a separate category from the other
crimes embraced in the Criminal Code. Such reasoning threat-
ens the whole tenor of the Criminal Code, which has sought to
eliminate artificial distinctions between the various forms of
criminal activity. To follow such a premise to its ultimate con-
clusion would result in a return to the uncertainties of the com-
mon law and the frequent mistrials which the short forms were
adopted to eliminate.
Justice Hamiter, speaking for the majority, said:
"... The question of whether or not the short form so used
herein satisfies the constitutional guaranty that an accused
shall be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation
against him need not be determined. If the information as
originally drafted be defective in that respect, the defect was
cured by the answer filed by the district attorney pursuant to
defendant's motion for a bill of particulars."' 8
The conclusion reached is undoubtedly correct, but the writer
left himself open to attack by the dissenting justices. The right
to demand a bill of particulars is essential to the constitutionality
of the short form indictment procedure, but it is not the function
of a bill of particulars to cure a defective indictment. Justice
Rogers, speaking for the court in the recent case of State v. Bien-
venu,"9 declared:
"The sole office of a bill of particulars is to give the adverse
party information which the pleadings by reason of their
generality do not give and to compel the State to observe
certain limitations in offering evidence. A bill of particulars
cannot change the offense charged nor in any way aid an in-
dictment or information fundamentally bad. '20
16. Art. 30, La. Crim. Code of 1942.
17. In a very recent case, State v. Frazier, 24 So. (2d) 620 (La. 1946), it
was held that a bill of information, which was stripped of surplusage and
drafted in accordance with the short form and charged defendant with at-
tempt to murder named person, was not fatally defective because of failure
to allege that defendant had specific intent to kill or inflict great bodily
harm.
18. State v. Davis, 23 So. (2d) 801, 803 (La. 1945).
19. State v. Bienvenu, 207 La. 859, 22 So. (2d) 196 (1945).
20. 207 La. 859, 865, 22 So. (2d) 196, 198.
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This position is supported by other authorities."'
The majority could have justified its decision by pointing out
that the information adequately charged the offense under Arti-
cle 90, and that the bill of particulars, which is not a part of the
indictment, accorded the constitutional rights of the accused a
full measure of protection. The purpose of the short form indict-
ment statute is to transfer the superfluous allegations in the
common law indictment forms to the bill of particulars, leaving
for the indictment the sole function of charging the accused with
the crime.
Had the supreme court ruled in the Davis case that the short
form indictment for gambling was insufficient, it would have
established a precedent which might well serve as an opening
wedge for a general attack upon the sufficiency of short form in-
dictments and the simplified methods of criminal procedure
which were envisaged by the draftsmen of the 1928 Code of Crim-
inal Procedure. It is regretted that the opinion of the supreme
court was not unanimous on so vital an issue. If the construc-
tions given the statute by the dissenting justices were carried to
the ultimate conclusion that astute defense lawyers will urge,
it would be a matter of a short while only before the short form
indictment would become a legal curiosity instead of the benefi-
cent remedial statute that a reasonable interpretation and appli-
cation can make it.
CECM C. CUTRE
Addendum
A recent case of particular importance to this subject has
been reported since this note was prepared.1
The defendant was charged with the crime of aggravated
rape pursuant to the short form provided for in Article 235 of the
Code of Criminal Procedure. The supreme court, without dis-
sent, reversed a judgment quashing the indictment. Justice
Ponder, speaking for the court, made the following significant
statements:
"It is to be noted that in Article 235, where the short
forms are set out, there is a provision to the effect that the
21. See authorities cited in 27 Am. Jur. 672, 673, § 112; 31 C.J. 752, 753,
§ 310.
1. State v. Chanet, 24 So. (2d) 670 (La. 1946).
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district attorney may be required to furnish a bill of particu-
lars setting forth more specifically the nature of the offense
charged. The defendant's constitutional guaranty that he
shall be fully apprised of the nature and cause of the accusa-
tion is amply protected by this provision."
"It might be suggested that Article 235 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure does not make it mandatory upon the
court to require the State to furnish the particulars. While it
is discretionary with the trial judge, yet, he cannot arbitrarily
refuse to order the State to furnish essential particulars.
"This Court has upheld the short form of indictment on
charges for murder, State v. Capaci, 179 La. 462, 154 So.
419; State v. Matthews, 189 La. 166, 179 So. 69; forgery, State
v. Ducre, 173 La. 438, 137 So. 745; State v. Digilormo, 200 La.
895, 9 So. (2d) 221; State v. Pete, 206 La. 1078, 20 So. (2d) 368;
perjury, State v. Abeny, 168 La. 1135, 123 So. 807; negligent
homicide, State v. Ward, supra.
"We see no valid reason why an indictment charging the
accused with the commission of aggravated rape upon a named
person as provided for in Article 235 is not equally sufficient.
Moreover, a defendant is amply protected when the short
form is used by the provision granting him essential particu-
lars when requested." 2
C. C. C.
EQuTY-PERsoNAL SERVICE CONTRACTS-ENFORCEMENT OF
NEGATIVE COVENANTs-Defendant was the inventor of an "Atomis-
scope" which could be successfully employed in geophysical
work. In consideration of a monthly salary and as part of a gen-
eral plan to develop the device, he contracted with the plaintiff,
an experienced oil man, to render exclusive services in the opera-
tion of the instrument. He also covenanted not to lend, give, sell,
or demonstrate the instrument to any other person. Defendant
breached his contract and rendered services to others. Plaintiff
brought an injunction suit and defendant filed an exception of
no cause of action. The Louisiana Supreme Court held the serv-
ices were of a special, unique and extraordinary character, over-
ruled the exception of no cause of action, and reinstated the tem-
porary restraining order. Pennington v. Drews, 24 So. (2d) 156
(La. 1945).
2. Id. at 671.
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